北約成立 75 周年：慶祝和清醒的時刻

關鍵要點
在全球危機加劇的時代，一個強大而有能力的北約至關重要。烏克蘭戰爭表明，歐洲人對安全的看法需要發生深刻轉變。北約近年來取得了進展，但在適應動蕩的新時代的危險方面還有很長的路要走。 6park.com
 6park.com
關鍵要點
在全球危機加劇的時代，一個強大而有能力的北約至關重要。烏克蘭戰爭表明，歐洲人對安全的看法需要發生深刻轉變。北約近年來取得了進展，但在適應動蕩的新時代的危險方面還有很長的路要走。

週一， 8 七月 2024
United States Institute of Peace 6park.com
作者： A. Wess Mitchell 博士 6park.com

來自歐洲和北美各地的領導人於 7 月齊聚華盛頓，紀念北大西洋公約組織 (NATO) 成立 75 週年。這次會議是慶祝北約作為聯盟所取得的成就以及自烏克蘭戰爭爆發以來所取得的進步的一個機會。但在地緣政治競爭重新出現以及全球範圍內隨之而來的危險不斷增加之際，這也應該是對北約能力真實狀況的深入檢查。一個強大的北約對於今天的美國國家安全和國際和平與 75 年前一樣至關重要。但要讓北約在正在展開的動盪新時代充分發揮其潛力，我們還有很長的路要走。
塑造全球和平與安全
第一：慶祝活動。我們理所當然地認為北約或類似組織的存在，但這還遠遠不是定局。 1949 年北約成立時，它代表了美國外交政策的巨大變化。到那時為止，美國一般都傾向於避免建立長期聯盟。三十年前，第一次世界大戰結束後，英國和法國試圖說服美國加入和平時期的聯盟，但未能成功。如果華盛頓接受他們的邀請，我們或許可以避免第二次世界大戰。透過組成北約，我們結束了美國以消防隊的方式應對歐洲戰爭的舊循環，等到他們爆發才做出反應，然後撤軍，只有在下一次戰爭到來時才會重複這種模式。
我們理所當然地認為北約或類似組織的存在，但這還遠遠不是定局。
值得考慮的是，如果北約從未成立，世界將會有多麼不同。 1949年華盛頓條約簽署時，蘇聯正在歐洲進軍。他們剛剛控制了捷克斯洛伐克並封鎖了柏林。蘇聯特工在法國、希臘和義大利煽動暴動。歐洲在經濟上已經疲憊不堪，無力抵抗。完全可以想像，如果美國和西歐主要國家沒有在馬歇爾計劃的經濟援助的支持下聯合起來建立一個常設聯盟，整個大陸到英吉利海峽可能都會落入蘇聯的影響之下。
如果冷戰後北約沒有擴展到中東歐，世界也會大不相同。當時，大西洋兩岸的許多觀察家都希望北約解散，或至少不讓它擴張。人們認為，俄羅斯很快就會成為一個民主國家，而整合的歐洲也有能力自立。如今，俄羅斯領導人喜歡將北約東擴描述為對俄羅斯歷史勢力範圍的侵犯。但在史達林佔領之前的幾個世紀裡，中歐大部分地區一直是西方秩序不可分割的一部分。如果沒有北約的擴張，今天該聯盟很可能會在波蘭的維斯瓦河或奧得河沿岸而不是烏克蘭的第聶伯河與俄羅斯發動代理人戰爭。
現在比以往任何時候都更需要北約
快進到 2024 年。都越來越多合作。但 1949 年北約必要性的邏輯在 2024 年仍然必要。與 1949 年一樣，它的任務是保衛歐洲-大西洋地區免受外部侵略——這意味著來自俄羅斯的攻擊。透過履行這項核心使命，北約產生的積極外部性遠遠超出了歐洲。
1949 年北約必要性的邏輯在 2024 年仍然必要。

從美國國家安全的角度來看，強大的北約可以增加美國應對東亞或中東軍事危機的頻寬，同時又不會危及歐洲的穩定。在冷戰時期，我們可以將大量軍隊從歐洲轉移到亞洲（例如在朝鮮戰爭和越南戰爭中），並保證歐洲在歐洲的軍事集結——僅西德就擁有近 130 萬人。蘇聯的機會主義。今天，這將變得更加困難，因為歐洲的軍事力量比當時弱得多，而中國在各方面都比當時強大得多。因此，從這個意義上說，一個強大的北約，由歐洲人承擔前線防禦重擔，對於全球整體穩定來說，今天可以說比過去更重要。

Leaders from across Europe and North America will gather in July in Washington to commemorate the 75th anniversary of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The meeting will be a chance to celebrate NATO’s accomplishments as an alliance as well as the improvements it has made since the start of the Ukraine war. But it should also be a gut-check on the real state of NATO capabilities at a time of renewed geopolitical rivalry and attendant mounting dangers worldwide. A strong NATO is as essential for U.S. national security and international peace today as it was 75 years ago. But we have a long way to go before NATO can live up to its full potential in the turbulent new era that is unfolding.
Shaping Global Peace and Security
First: the celebration. We take it for granted that NATO or something like it would exist, but that was far from a foregone conclusion. When NATO was created in 1949, it represented a sea change in U.S. foreign policy. Up to that time, America had tended to generally avoid standing alliances. Thirty years earlier, after World War I, Britain and France tried but failed to convince America to participate in a peacetime alliance. Had Washington taken them up on the invitation, we might have avoided World War II. By forming NATO, we ended the old cycle whereby the United States would respond to European wars in fire-brigade fashion, waiting until they broke out to respond then withdrawing afterwards, only to repeat the pattern when the next war came.
We take it for granted that NATO or something like it would exist, but that was far from a foregone conclusion.
It’s worth considering how different the world might look had NATO never been formed. When the Washington Treaty was signed in 1949, the Soviets were on the march in Europe. They had just seized control of Czechoslovakia and sealed off Berlin. Soviet agents were fomenting unrest in France, Greece and Italy. Europe was economically exhausted and in no condition to resist. It is entirely conceivable that the entire continent up to the English Channel might have fallen under Soviet influence had the United States and the major nations of Western Europe not banded together to create a standing alliance, backed by the economic aid of the Marshall Plan.
The world would also look very different had NATO not expanded into East-Central Europe after the Cold War. At the time, a lot of observers on both sides of the Atlantic wanted NATO dismantled or, at the very least, for it to not expand. Russia would soon be a democracy, the thinking went, and an integrating Europe was capable of fending for itself. Russian leaders nowadays like to portray NATO’s eastern enlargement as an infringement on historic Russian spheres of influence. But most of Central Europe had been an integral part of the Western order for centuries before Stalin grabbed them. Absent NATO’s expansion, it’s likely that today the alliance would be waging a proxy war with Russia on the banks of Poland’s Vistula or Oder rivers rather than Ukraine’s Dnieper.
NATO Is Needed Now More than Ever
Fast forward to 2024. NATO’s founders could not have foreseen a world where, in addition to Russia, the West faces a rising China more powerful than the Soviet Union at its zenith, as well as a nuclear-armed North Korea and potentially nuclear-armed Iran — all of which, increasingly, are working together. But the same logic that made NATO necessary in 1949 still makes it necessary in 2024. To be clear, NATO’s charter mandates that it focus militarily on Europe. As in 1949, its job is to defend the Euro-Atlantic area from outside aggression — which means an attack from Russia. By fulfilling that core mission, NATO produces positive externalities far beyond Europe.
The same logic that made NATO necessary in 1949 still makes it necessary in 2024.
From the standpoint of U.S. national security, a strong NATO increases America’s bandwidth for responding to military crises in East Asia or the Middle East without jeopardizing European stability. In the Cold War, we could shift massive numbers of troops from Europe to Asia (in the Korean and Vietnam wars, for example) with the assurance that the build-up of European forces in Europe — West Germany alone had nearly 1.3 million men under arms — would dissuade Soviet opportunism. Today, that would be much harder, both because Europe is far weaker militarily, and China far stronger in every way, than was the case back then. So, in this sense, a strong NATO with Europeans who are shouldering the frontline defense burden is arguably more essential today for overall global stability than it was in the past.
Looking to the Future
How well are we doing in that goal? On one hand, the Ukraine war has done a lot to wake up European members of NATO to the urgent necessity of self-defense in the current global moment. Since the start of that war, European members of NATO have increased defense spending by a remarkable 27 percent, or nearly $100 billion, collectively. This year alone, European allies are expected to invest a total of around $380 billion, which is more than triple the Russian defense budget. By the time of the July summit, as many as 23 of the 32 members of the alliance will be meeting their commitment to spend 2 percent of GDP on defense (compared to six prior to the war). Taken as a whole, Europe is surpassing that threshold for the first time since the end of the Cold War.
The problem is that we have a long way to go before these numbers translate into capabilities. European defense was in a state of atrophy for a long time. Real progress has been made over the last three years, but not enough. Key munitions have to be replenished, new weapons purchased and brought into service, and new cadres trained — all while sustaining an unbroken flow of supplies to Ukraine. To an even greater extent than in the United States, the European defense-industrial base urgently needs to be brought back to life, and given the resources, incentives and regulatory environment necessary to expand beyond the boutique production volumes required for NATO operations in Afghanistan. All of that takes time.
It's not just about weapons. The Ukraine war showed that a deeper mental shift is needed in how Europeans think about security. After the Cold War, Western societies came to believe that traditional geopolitics had ended. After 9/11, Western militaries became habituated to the doctrines and mindsets needed for counter-insurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Both notions have to be discarded and replaced with an acceptance of the fact that old-fashioned geopolitics is back, and that the greatest threat to Western societies comes once again from large, determined, ideologically motivated states that have the capacity to wage industrialized, high-intensity warfare of a kind not seen since the mid-20th century.
Against that backdrop, the upcoming Washington summit will give us a chance to take stock and see how well NATO is evolving to reflect the new realities. Two things in particular bear watching.
What to Watch for at the Washington NATO Summit
One is what NATO commits to doing to help keep Ukraine supplied with weapons. Three years into the war, it is clear it will be prolonged. Putin’s theory of victory seems to be that he can mobilize Russia’s superior numbers to wear down Ukraine’s will to resist while running out the clock on its Western backers. NATO has never faced a frontier proxy war of this kind. If Ukraine falls, the alliance could find itself facing direct Russian military pressure along a much longer frontier than it had to manage in the past.
At the NATO summit in Vilnius last year, allied leaders agreed to language supporting an eventual Ukrainian entry into NATO. It’s possible alliance leaders will invite Ukraine to begin membership negotiations in the North Atlantic Council — NATO’s principal political decision-making body — next month. But as long as the war goes on, NATO is unlikely to support a move toward membership that could involve the alliance in a direct confrontation with Russia. Given this, NATO will have to look for other ways to signal its materiel and political support to Ukraine over a long-time horizon.
Things seem to be moving in the right direction on this front. In June, the United States signed a 10-year security agreement with Ukraine that is similar to the arrangement it maintains with Israel, and members of the G7 agreed to give the country a $50 billion loan, paid for by frozen Russian assets. Expect to see more in this vein at the NATO summit, including new commitments to supply Ukraine with ammunition and restock provisions in Europe. But behind these promises, watch to see if NATO allies are actually taking the steps — like introducing new contracting methods, revising arms export controls, refining manufacturing models, or providing financing for defense start-ups — needed to ramp up defense production on the enormous scale required to support Ukraine long enough to defeat Putin’s theory of victory.
A second thing to watch is what NATO is doing to improve its ability to deliver on its core mission of defense and deterrence. At summits in Madrid and Vilnius, allies committed to maintaining larger forces on a standing basis on NATO’s eastern flank, including four new battle groups, a new rotational model for eastern air defenses, and the maintenance of 300,000 troops at high readiness. But implementation has been uneven, to put it politely. Major Western European allies have struggled to get eastern deployments up to the new division-level requirements. Air defense rotation has yet to materialize. And while allies had no trouble earmarking high-readiness forces, there are serious questions about how these troops would actually be generated or sustained in a crisis.
What that means in practice is that NATO forces in the eastern flank remain essentially a tripwire. One decade after Russia used the technique of creating a fait accompli by grabbing Crimea, NATO’s most exposed eastern members remain vulnerable to exactly that kind of scenario. That means in a crisis scenario we would be in the difficult position of trying to compel Russia to disgorge territory rather than deterring the attack in the first place. That, in turn, makes NATO much more reliant on nuclear weapons for security, and on the United States for conventional defense at a time when the United States has also have to keep an eye on other simmering pots. And it undermines NATO cohesion in a very tangible way, since eastern members of the alliance will correctly perceive that, despite all the rhetoric, NATO remains effectively a two-tier alliance. 
The unfortunate reality is that, behind all the announcements and progress of the last three years, NATO today is not where it needs to be.
In both cases, the unfortunate reality is that, behind all the announcements and progress of the last three years, NATO today is not where it needs to be. It’s not where it needs to be in terms of having the physical ability to supply Ukraine for the long haul. And it’s not where it needs to be in terms of credibly deterring and defending against an attack on its own eastern members. None of this is to gainsay NATO’s very real accomplishments to date, or to diminish its political and strategic value to the United States, or to cast shade on the very real progress that has been made since the start of the Ukraine war. But as was true in the Cold War, NATO today has to be judged by its actions and not just its words. So, we should celebrate NATO’s anniversary in July, but we should also hold the alliance to the same very high standards that its members lived by during the Cold War. That’s the best way to ensure that the remarkable alliance our grandparents built will still be around for our grandkids.

PHOTO: President Joe Biden takes part in a group photo with other leaders at the NATO Summit at the Walter E. Washington Convention Center in Washington, on Wednesday, July 10, 2024. (Eric Lee/The New York Times)
The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s).